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How Alchemy is preparing for post-quantum cryptography

Source: Alchemy•November 19, 2026 at 04:44 PM

How Alchemy is preparing for post-quantum cryptography

Harvest now, decrypt later means quantum risk has already started. What quantum computers break, the NIST timeline, and how Alchemy is preparing for post-quantum cryptography.

Here is the uncomfortable part of quantum security. Someone can record your encrypted traffic today, store it, and unlock it years from now when a powerful enough quantum computer exists. Security teams call this "harvest now, decrypt later." For data that has to stay private for ten or twenty years, the clock has already started.

Quantum risk isn't one company's problem. It reaches every bank, payment network and blockchain that relies on today's cryptography, and closing it will take years of coordinated work across the industry. Alchemy's part is the infrastructure layer: the connections, keys and systems that carry our customers' traffic onchain. Here's how we think about the risk, what the timeline looks like, and what we're doing about our part of it.

Our short answer: post-quantum risk is real and manageable, and it calls for steady, well-tracked migration, not emergency response. Data in our cloud-managed estate is encrypted at rest with AES-256, which quantum computers don't meaningfully weaken, connections to our dashboard, sign-in and app APIs already use post-quantum key exchange, and we're running a phased program to extend that protection across the rest of our stack.

What quantum computers break, and what they don't

Most encrypted connections rely on two kinds of cryptography working together.

The first is public-key cryptography: RSA and the elliptic-curve methods ECDSA, ECDH, X25519 and ed25519. Think of it as the handshake. It lets two systems agree on a secret key without ever sending it, and it's what makes a digital signature provable.

The second is symmetric cryptography, such as AES-256, along with hash functions like SHA-256 and SHA-384. Once the handshake is done, this is what actually locks the data.

A large enough quantum computer running Shor's algorithm breaks the handshake. It could recover the private key behind a public key, then read a recorded session or forge a signature.

It doesn't meaningfully break the lock. Grover's algorithm, the quantum method that applies to symmetric encryption, roughly halves its effective strength, which still leaves AES-256 and SHA-256 strong. AES-128 is the weak spot, which is why the standard is AES-256.

So the work comes down to one split:

  • Needs replacing: key exchange, certificates and digital signatures built on RSA and elliptic curves.
  • Stays safe: data encrypted with AES-256, and hashes such as SHA-256.

Why long-lived data is the first concern

An attacker doesn't need a quantum computer today to cause a problem later. They can record encrypted traffic now and hold it until they can break the handshake that protected it. So the first thing to move is the transport layer, the connections that carry sensitive, long-lived data. The migration has to finish ahead of quantum computers by at least as long as that data needs to stay confidential.

The fix already exists, and parts of Alchemy already use it. Hybrid post-quantum key exchange runs two methods in every handshake: a proven classical one and a quantum-resistant one standardized by NIST, called ML-KEM. If either is ever broken, the other still protects the session. The most widely adopted version is X25519MLKEM768. Connections to our dashboard, sign-in and app APIs already use it, and we're extending it across the rest of our stack. Those routes carry sign-in credentials and private account data. Most requests to our node infrastructure read or submit blockchain data that's public once it's onchain, so they hold fewer of the long-lived secrets that harvest now, decrypt later targets.

The standards clock

The rules are taking shape, and they give a practical window:

  • In August 2024, NIST published its first post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key exchange, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for signatures. See NIST's post-quantum cryptography project.
  • In October 2026, NIST finalized its transition guidance, IR 8547. It deprecates today's quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows them after 2035. It's written for federal systems, but NIST expects the timeline to apply well beyond them.
  • The NSA's CNSA 2.0 requires post-quantum cryptography for national security systems on a ramp from 2025 to 2033, which makes it a useful benchmark.

In practical terms, the migration window runs from now to about 2030, with a hard stop in 2035. Because of harvest now, decrypt later, the clock for confidential data is already running.

Blockchains have a second, separate problem

If you work with blockchain infrastructure, there's another exposure to understand. Blockchain signatures, like ECDSA on Ethereum and Bitcoin and ed25519 on Solana, prove who authorized a transaction. They don't hide anything.

A quantum computer wouldn't decrypt those signatures. It could work out a private key from a public key that has already been exposed, and then forge valid signatures. That's a different risk from harvest now, decrypt later, and re-encrypting data doesn't fix it.

Two things follow:

  • The fix lives at the protocol level. Moving to post-quantum signatures such as ML-DSA or SLH-DSA is a decision for the chains themselves, like Ethereum, Solana and Bitcoin. No single infrastructure provider can ship it alone, and no provider is uniquely exposed.
  • There's a small interim margin on some chains. On Ethereum accounts and older Bitcoin address types, the address is a hash of the public key, so the key stays hidden until the address first sends a transaction. On Solana, and on newer Bitcoin addresses such as Taproot, the public key is visible from the start. It's a margin, not a fix.

Ethereum, for example, publishes a quantum-resistance roadmap. Our job is to keep our infrastructure flexible enough to support new signature types and larger signature sizes the moment chains and signing providers move.

Where we're focused

We've completed a deep internal analysis of our post-quantum readiness and launched a formal, phased remediation program, prioritized by risk and measured against industry frameworks.

We run on infrastructure providers that were early to post-quantum, so a lot of the protection is already in place where they terminate encryption and manage keys. Our own work is making sure it holds: verifying that post-quantum key exchange is actually used, closing gaps, and extending coverage across the rest of our stack. Here are the areas we're focused on:

Area

What it covers

What we're doing

Data at rest

Stored data, encrypted with AES-256 through managed key services

Already quantum-safe, since AES-256 is symmetric. We're closing remaining encryption gaps in infrastructure we run ourselves.

Data in transit at the edge

Connections from customers into our network

Hybrid post-quantum key exchange is live on routes served through our edge provider, including our dashboard, sign-in and app APIs. We check that it's actually negotiated and are extending it to the rest of our customer-facing traffic.

Data in transit, end to end

Connections across our stack, through load balancers and gateways

Moving to TLS 1.3, which post-quantum key exchange requires, and enabling post-quantum security policies, with compliance tracked continuously.

Long-lived confidential data

Data that has to stay private for years

Prioritizing post-quantum-capable transport for it and reducing unnecessary retention.

Crypto inventory and agility

Every place we use cryptography

Keeping a formal inventory, upgrading libraries to post-quantum-capable versions and moving key management toward post-quantum algorithms.

Blockchain signatures

Wallet and transaction signatures on each chain

Set by each chain's protocol. We're preparing our wallet and account infrastructure to support non-ECDSA signers and larger post-quantum signatures through account abstraction.

This work sits on top of the security program our enterprise customers already rely on. For that foundation, read Inside Alchemy's enterprise-grade security infrastructure.

How we approach it

Our approach follows the emerging industry view: safe today, prepare now. It rests on four commitments.

  • Crypto-agility. We design systems so algorithms can be swapped through configuration instead of being hardcoded, so we can adopt new standards as they mature.
  • Verification over assumption. We measure whether post-quantum key exchange is actually negotiated where it's supported, instead of assuming inherited protection works.
  • Clear lines of responsibility. We separate what we own, infrastructure transport readiness, from what the wider ecosystem owns, chain-level signature migration. We coordinate with our partners and the chains we serve.
  • Phased, tracked remediation. A multi-phase program runs from discovery and inventory through transit fixes, vendor alignment and blockchain readiness, with measurable targets and named owners.

This reflects our current posture. Cryptographic migration is a multi-year effort across the whole industry, and we'll update this post as standards and ecosystem plans move.

Questions to ask any infrastructure vendor

If you're running a vendor review, these questions get to the point quickly:

  • What's your plan and timeline for supporting post-quantum algorithms?
  • Where is post-quantum key exchange already negotiated, and how do you verify that?
  • Do you keep an inventory of the cryptography you use, and who owns it?
  • How do you handle long-lived confidential data in the meantime?
  • What do you depend on the chains or your own vendors to fix?

We're glad to answer these for your team. For the broader vendor review, How banks evaluate blockchain risk covers the other risks bank teams assess and 10 more questions to ask any infrastructure provider.

Get started

Have a security or procurement review coming up? Send us your vendor questionnaire through our team, and we'll connect your security and risk leads with ours to walk through our plan. You can also review our controls and certifications in our Trust Center.

FAQ

What is quantum readiness?

Quantum readiness means being prepared to move from today's public-key cryptography to algorithms that quantum computers can't break. It involves taking inventory of the cryptography you use, upgrading key exchange and signatures, and staying flexible enough to adopt new standards as they mature.

What is harvest now, decrypt later?

It's an attack where someone records encrypted traffic today and stores it until a quantum computer can decrypt it. It matters most for data that has to stay confidential for many years, which is why transport encryption is the first thing to upgrade.

Does quantum computing break AES-256?

No. Grover's algorithm roughly halves the effective strength of symmetric encryption, which still leaves AES-256 strong. The algorithms at risk are public-key methods such as RSA, ECDSA and X25519, which protect key exchange and signatures.

Are blockchains exposed to quantum risk?

Yes, through their signatures. A quantum computer could derive a private key from an exposed public key and forge signatures. The fix is a protocol-level move to post-quantum signatures, which chains like Ethereum, Solana and Bitcoin have to make for the whole ecosystem.

When do we need to be ready?

NIST's final guidance deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows them after 2035, so the practical window runs from now to about 2030. Long-lived confidential data is already exposed to harvest now, decrypt later, so start with the transport layer that carries it.

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